The Upgraded "National Defense Mobilization Law": Experts Suggest It’s Tailored for a Taiwan Strait War?

Among Taiwan's various outlying islands, Kinmen, Matsu, and Dongsha hold important positions in defence. (Google Maps/Dajiyuan illustration)

[People News] The Chinese Communist Party has made significant revisions to the "National Defense Mobilization Law" for the first time in 16 years, set to take effect on October 1. The revisions include provisions allowing for the legal "requisition and expropriation" of civilian resources when necessary. Analysts believe this amendment is specifically designed for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, posing dual political and economic risks for Taiwanese businesses operating on the mainland.

As reported by Voice of America, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party approved the revised "National Defense Mobilization Law" on August 28, with implementation scheduled for next month. The updated law comprises 14 chapters and 82 articles, addressing areas such as national defense mobilization planning, implementation strategies, potential statistical surveys, reserve personnel management and conscription, strategic material reserves and deployment, military research, production and maintenance support, as well as disaster prevention and relief in wartime.

Deng Yuwen: The New Law is Tailored for a Possible Taiwan Strait War

In comparison to the previous law from 2010, the newly revised "National Defense Mobilization Law" explicitly states that its purpose is to "strengthen national defense construction, improve the national defense mobilization system, ensure the smooth execution of national defense mobilization efforts, and safeguard the country's sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security, and development interests."

Deng Yuwen, former deputy editor of the Central Party School's publication "Study Times," remarked in an interview with Voice of America that while Beijing's law revision is not specifically aimed at Taiwan, it is indeed tailored for a potential outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait.

Deng Yuwen stated, "On one hand, the competition between the U.S. and China is intensifying, and the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and major Western powers is also quite tense. The risk of losing control over the military situation across the Taiwan Strait is significant, and Taiwan's push for independence is becoming increasingly pronounced. For Beijing, it is crucial to prevent such a scenario. If a war were to erupt in the Taiwan Strait, it would likely be a high-intensity modern conflict, rather than the traditional form of warfare."

He elaborated that the Russia-Ukraine war and the recent conflict between the U.S. and Iran serve as important references. A potential war in the Taiwan Strait could be more intense and severe than these two conflicts. If the conflict were to last, Beijing might not need to mobilize for war for the first week, but if it extends to a month, six months, or even longer, it is clear that the entire national economic system and social structure would have to rapidly shift into a wartime footing.

Nonetheless, Shen Mingshi, the director of the National Security Research Institute at Taiwan's National Defense Security Research Institute, believes that Beijing will refrain from military action against Taiwan for at least the next two years.

Shen Mingshi stated, "The completion of the regulatory revisions does not imply that the necessary capabilities are in place. Considering the current internal and external environment of the Chinese Communist Party, the likelihood of military action against Taiwan in 2027 or 2028 is diminishing. If Xi Jinping secures a fourth term, when U.S. President Trump leaves office in 2028, Beijing might believe that the United States will not intervene, which could prompt military action against Taiwan. Furthermore, if Xi Jinping remains in power until 2030 or 2032, he may aim to achieve historic milestones or promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation during his tenure, potentially leading to military action against Taiwan. However, if Xi Jinping does not continue after the Fifth Plenary Session or the 21st National Congress, the revision of the National Defense Mobilization Law will only reflect the principle of 'governing the military by law and governing the country by law.'"

Incorporating Economic and Technological Mobilization

The new law for the first time defines 'national defense mobilization' as 'activities that ensure a swift transition between peacetime and wartime, converting economic and social capabilities into national defense capabilities.' According to the provisions, authorities are empowered to impose controls on sectors such as finance, transportation, telecommunications, and consulting networks as necessary.

Shen Mingshi from the National Security Research Institute of the Taiwan National Defense Security Research Institute remarked to Voice of America that this legislative change is evidently influenced by significant military conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war.

Shen Mingshi stated, "The application of drones and related technologies has a global impact. The ongoing war has accelerated the growth of Ukraine's drone industry, leading to a significant increase in production demand. Countries like the United States, Japan, and Taiwan are also enhancing their drone development efforts. The Chinese Communist Party should take this into account. Furthermore, the nature of warfare is evolving. There is a growing demand for long-range drones, combat drones, and even small drones, making their mobilization increasingly crucial. The key factor in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the sanctions imposed on Russia. In the context of these sanctions, mobilization becomes even more vital. If certain items cannot be imported, how can domestic production capabilities be established?

Commentator Deng Yuwen remarked that the Russia-Ukraine war and the US-Iran conflict have made Beijing aware that modern warfare involves not only the strength of frontline troops but also technology, logistics, industrial capacity, and the societal ability to sustain prolonged conflicts. For the authorities, ensuring a swift transition between peacetime and wartime is essential.

Deng Yuwen elaborated, "'Peace' signifies tranquility, while 'war' obviously denotes conflict. Modern warfare targets a nation's industrial foundation and capacity, necessitating a rapid conversion of economic power into defense capabilities, particularly in light of a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which could also involve a future war between China and Japan. If China faces sanctions from the United States and the West, will its supply chain be disrupted, and can the manufacturing sector, including private enterprises, continue to function under such sanctions?"

The new legislation has introduced the term 'development interests' in reference to the objectives of national defense mobilization.

Shen Mingshi stated: "In a narrower context, future conflicts and wars may arise from development interests with other countries, leading to mobilization. (In a broader context) This is not necessarily related to conflicts and wars; it is simply due to development interests, such as the semiconductor industry, which is crucial for the Chinese Communist Party in terms of both technological and economic advancement. In such cases, the government can invoke 'development interests' as a justification to mobilize or concentrate the technology and production capacity of private industries. This does not have to involve warfare or conflict; it can purely be for national security or economic development, allowing the government to requisition or expropriate resources under the guise of national security or the potential for war, thereby enhancing its legitimacy."

The issue of 'expropriation' has ignited controversy, placing Taiwanese businesses in a 'high-risk' position.

The provisions of the 'National Defense Mobilization Law' concerning the expropriation of civilian resources have garnered significant attention. The new regulation states that once the state decides to implement national defense mobilization, if reserve materials cannot be provided in time to meet mobilization needs, governments at the county level and above are authorized to legally 'expropriate and requisition' civilian resources. The term 'requisition' is understood as 'temporary use,' while 'expropriation' is widely interpreted to mean 'not to be returned,' leading to disputes.

Shen Mingshi from the National Security Research Institute of the Taiwan National Defense Security Research Institute clarified: 'Requisition means that I will use it for this war, and I might compensate you, or I might not. Expropriation means that once I take it, it becomes military property, and it may not necessarily be returned to you.'

Shen Mingshi emphasized that, in both economic and political contexts, the new law could place Taiwanese businesses operating in mainland China at significant risk.

He stated, "In the past, traditional mobilization methods, such as food, steel, and energy, were part of a more conventional approach to warfare. However, now many high-tech elements and human resources are incorporated, and these human resources are not necessarily reserve forces; they could include civilian technology and experts. If the focus is on the requisition or appropriation of interests related to high-tech developments, such as drones, artificial intelligence, big data, space technology, or cyber hackers, it could impact Taiwanese businesses or foreign investors." 

If the authorities decide to 'requisition' or 'appropriate' and Taiwan does not comply, it will face various forms of suppression. 

Shen Mingshi remarked, "From a political standpoint, if the authorities proceed with requisition or appropriation and you do not agree, they may find various political justifications to suppress you, or accuse you of committing a crime, or frame you with charges related to national security, enabling them to directly confiscate your assets. Additionally, after requisitioning the assets of Taiwanese businesses, the authorities may use them against Taiwan or the Taiwanese military, implying that you are 'a resource for the enemy,' funding the enemy to attack Taiwan, which could be interpreted as treasonous behavior from Taiwan's perspective." 

However, he also noted that it remains to be seen whether the relevant provisions apply to foreign enterprises or Taiwanese businesses operating in mainland China. 

Zeng Zhichao, deputy secretary-general of the Taiwan Chinese Economic and Financial Association, mentioned in an interview with Voice of America that Taiwanese businesses investing in mainland China have consistently faced risks and uncertainties. The terms 'requisition' and 'appropriation' do not significantly differ in terms of their legal implications.

Zeng Zhichao stated, "In the event of significant political or military conflicts in the future, do you think the authorities will alter their requisition and conscription of materials and personnel from Taiwanese businesses? I believe there will not be much impact, and no fundamental changes will occur. What Beijing needs can still mobilize all your resources."

Zeng Zhichao cautioned Taiwanese businesses that they must be aware of the export controls and related legal risks posed by the United States and China moving forward.

Zeng Zhichao explained, "The red supply chain, where 'red' refers to China, means we will choose the manufacturer with the lowest price. However, due to concerns about industrial and national security, the United States is now promoting a non-red supply chain, aiming to reduce specific dependencies on China. After facing U.S. export controls, the Chinese Communist Party realized that in many sectors, such as semiconductors, they could not access certain materials. Even though the R&D costs are high, they still have to opt for domestic production. When Taiwanese businesses engage with both the red and non-red supply chains, they must clearly define their position. They also need to understand all legal regulations regarding exports to avoid infringing on sensitive technologies or regulations, and they must consider the risks of being caught in the crossfire between the U.S. and China."

This approach brings flexibility to the reserve personnel.

The recent amendment to the law also focuses on human mobilization, introducing the term 'reserve personnel' to differentiate it from the previous 'reserve forces.' Under this law, the State Council and the Central Military Commission will determine the scale, types, and methods of reserve personnel reserves based on the needs of national defense mobilization. Reserve personnel are mandated to participate in training as stipulated by law. With a few exceptions, such as pregnancy or illness, all male and female citizens who meet the age criteria are required to fulfill national defense duties.

Shen Mingshi believes this amendment introduces flexibility into the reserve personnel system.

Shen Mingshi remarked, 'Flexibility means that even if you are not on the reserve list, you could still be mobilized for war. The law specifies that males aged 18 to 60 and females aged 18 to 55 are included in national defense mobilization. These individuals may serve as logistics or support personnel in combat, though they are not necessarily frontline combatants. However, if there is a shortage of frontline personnel, there is at least a pool of individuals within that age range. Once mobilization is announced, those individuals cannot leave the country, must remain in China, and will be on standby for mobilization.'

In anticipation of the newly revised National Defense Mobilization Law taking effect next month, the National Development and Reform Commission of the Communist Party of China has set up a 'Comprehensive Department of National Defense Mobilization' to handle the daily operations of the 'National Defense Mobilization Committee.' △